Abstract. Guirao and Rubio [6] introduces an economic model, which generalizes the classical duopoly of Cournot type, where the competitors are located around a circle or a line and each rm competes à la Cournot with its right and left neighboring. For the case of having three and four players we describe completely the bifurcations of equilibria in terms of the production costs of each rm and we study the stability of them. Moreover, for the case of four players we provide some information on the twoperiodic orbits of the system.
Introduction and statement of the main result
Cournot duopoly was introduced by Agustin Cournot [2] who is consider on of the forerunner of the modern microeconomics. The process consists of two rms which produce an identical good and which compete for the market. In each step of the process the rms decide the amount of product which introduce in the market and for making this decision both rms know the amount of product introduced in the market in the previous step by the rival rm. This economic process is mathematically modeled by the following twodimensional discrete dynamical system (1) F (x, y) = (g(y), f (x)) where f, g are continuous selfmaps dened on a compact interval which can be considered, without loss of generality, by normalization [0, 1] . The maps f and g are called the reaction functions and determine the decisions made by the rms.
Note that if rm A put on the market at the beginning of the game α 0 product and rm B put β 0 , in the next step of the game rm A will produce g(β 0 ), i.e. an amount of product which directly depends on the production level of the rm B in the previous step, on the other hand rm B will produce f (α 0 ) and so on. Therefore, all the process is governed by the dynamics of the discrete system (1) which strongly depends on the dynamics of the onedimensional interval maps f and g.
Duopoly is an intermediate situation between monopoly and perfect competition, and analytically is a more complicated case. The reason for this is that oligopolist must consider not only the behaviors of the costumers, but also those of the competitors and their reactions, thus this model has been studied in the literature from dierent points of view, see for instance [1] , [3] [4], [7] , [8] [9] , [10] , [11] or [12] . While dynamic properties of duopolies have been extensively studied, adjustment dynamics in Cournot processes with more than two players has received much less attention as a consequence of the diculties which appear for studying discrete dynamical systems with dimension higher than two. The direct generalization of the Cournot duopoly situation is the Cournot oligopoly, i.e. consider n rms which produce and identical good and in each step of the process any rm knows the amount of product generated by the n − 1 rival rms in the previous step. Now, the systems which models the situation is given by (2) 
is a continuous map. We note that the reaction function f i depends on n − 1 variables of indices j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, j = i.
To study the dynamics for a system like (2) is quite complicated by the ignorance of the topological dynamics of ndimensional discrete dynamical systems with n > 2 (e.g., note that for these type of systems are not characterized the possible ωlimit sets of the orbits).
Thus, if we want to have some chance of describing dynamics we need to simplify the system with the cost of losing information by the players on the production level of the rivals.
In [5] is introduced the following model called Cournotlike system: Denition 1. A continuous map φ from [0, 1] n into itself is Cournotlike if it is of the form:
.., n} and σ is a cyclic permutation of the set {1, 2, ..., n}.
In the economic situation models by these type of systems the level of information is quite limited because any player rm only has information on the production level of one of the other rms in the previous step of the process. For these type of systems, see [5] , there is a characterization of the dynamical simplicity.
From our point of view Cournotlike models not represent a truthful economic situation since it is very dicult to explain the fact that each player rm only can has information on other rm having a complete ignorance on the rest of player behavior. For that reason Guirao and Rubio [6] introduces a new model where the information level is higher than in Cournotlike ones and where there is more chance for describing dynamical properties. See next section for a concrete description of this model. The aim of the present paper is, for dimensions 3 and 4, to describe completely the bifurcations of equilibria of this new model in terms of the production costs of each rm and we study the stability of them. Moreover, for the case of four players we are able to prove that the system has no twoperiodic orbits. The statement of our the main results is: Theorem 2. Let (F 3 , Ω 3 ) be the discrete dynamical system introduced in (3) . Then:
(i) if c 1 , c 2 and c 3 are not equal, there exists a unique equilibrium equal to (0, 0, 0) which is strongly unstable; (ii) if c i = c, i = 1, 2, 3, there exists another equilibrium, apart from the stated in (i), of the form ( Let (F 4 , Ω 4 ) be the discrete dynamical system introduced in (4 
is an equilibrium. Its stability depends of the values of c 2 and c 4 . In the case c i = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the equilibrium coincides with the presented one in (ii); (iv) if c 2 = c 4 and c 1 = c 3 , the equilibria are symmetric to the ones of case (iii) interchanging z with w, x with y, c 2 with c 1 , and c 4 with c 3 . Moreover, the system has no twoperiodic orbits.
The model
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be the set of players (i.e., rival rms which produces an identical good) and assume that are physically located around a circle or a line. We assume that the rms compete à la Cournot in a local way, i.e., each rm i ∈ N compete with its closest neighboring in the right and left direction. Let B α i ⊂ N be the neighboring located to distance equal to α of the rm i in the right and left direction. If we denote by (x 1 , ..., x n ) the production of the rms in some moment and by (c 1 , c 2 , ..., c n ) their production costs, the best response function for the rm i will have the form
We consider that B α i is composed by the left and right neighboring, i.e., α = 1. In this case, we note that if n = 2, we have the classical situation of the Cournot duopoly.
If we suppose that the number of players is equal to three, the model is governed by the threedimensional discrete dynamical system given by (3)
In the same way, for the case of having four rms, the model is dened by a fourdimensional discrete system F 4 (x, y, z, w) of the form (x, y, z, w) goes to (4) y + w c 1 − (y + w),
The objective of the next section is to study the equilibria of systems (3) and (4) in terms of production costs c i s. In the case n = 4 we give some information on the twoperiodic orbits.
Proof of Theorem 2
In this section we state the equilibria and their bifurcations for the system (3) depending on c i s. Proof of Theorem 2. We consider the map F 3 given by
A point (x, y, z) will be an equilibrium point if and only if is held simultaneously
Clearly, one solution of the system, for any value of c i s, is (0, 0, 0). Now, consider the equivalent system e 1 = e 2 = e 3 = 0 where
It is easy to note that the case c 3 = c 1 + c 2 does not provide any xed point dierent from the origin. If c 3 is dierent from c 1 + c 2 , the solution of the system e 1 = e 2 = e 3 = 0 is
This system has a solution dierent from z = 0 in the case c i = c, i = 1, 2, 3. .
In short, we obtain that (0, 0, 0) is always an equilibrium point, and when c 1 = c 2 = c 3 then In this setting we conclude that the origin is strongly unstable in all directions because the partial derivatives which appear in the matrix M tend to innity when (x, y, z) → 0. Let assume that the costs c i s are equal to c, then the characteristical polynomial of the matrix M evaluated at the equilibrium point is locally an attractor because the absolute value of the eigenvalues at this xed point are smaller than 1, ending the proof.
Remark 4. The dynamics on the straight line x = y = z when c 1 = c 2 = c 3 = c, is equivalent to the dynamics of an onedimensional map f : R → R dened by
is an attractor. The point x = 0 is strongly unstable.
Proof of Theorem 3
The equations of the equilibria points of the system (Ω 4 , F 4 ) where F 4 is the transformation such that every (x, y, z, w) goes to y + w c 1 − (y + w),
are the following: 0
where entry ai,j correspond to
∂α j with α1 = x, α2 = y, α3 = z and α4 = w.
Clearly, by the two previous expressions, always (0, 0, 0, 0) is a xed point strongly unstable because the derivatives of the linear part of the map at it goes to innity.
We consider now three dierent cases:
• Case c 1 = c 2 = c 3 = c. In this case the equilibria equations are reduced to
Solving this system we obtain that there is an additional equilibrium point of the form ( Computing, we reduce the problem to solve
We can assume that x is not zero, otherwise we obtain the equilibrium point (0, 0, 0, 0). Dividing equation (5) by √ x we obtain (6)
Replacing in equation (6) variable √ x by X we have
Now, we eliminate the squareroot containg the variable X in equation (7) taking squares, but note that doing this we can add ctious solutions. Thus,
and therefore computing is stated that the point
where α is the unique root of the cubic polynomial (8) is an equilibrium of the system dierent from the origin. Note that the stability of this equilibrium depends on the values of c 2 and c 4 and in the case c i = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, the equilibrium coincides with the presented one in (ii).
• Case c 4 = c 2 and c 3 = c 1 . In fact the equilibria points are symmetric to ones obatined in the previous case interchanging z with w, x with y, c 2 with c 1 , and c 4 with c 3 . For the case c i = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4, we study the twoperiodic orbits of the system (i.e., nonequilibria points with the property F 2 (x, y, z, w) = (x, y, z, w).) The equations of the twoperiodic points, for the case c i = c, i = 1, 2, 3, 4,, are the following:
• g 1 = x + 2z − 2 In this setting, g 1 − g 3 = −x + z and g 2 − g 4 = w − y being z = x and w = y. Therefore, the unique solution of this system is the xed point ( 
